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Joel Rogers
13.1 Introduction: A Failed System
Labor, management, and neutrals all agree that the New Deal system of
labor relations, codified in the Wagner and Taft-Hartley acts of 1935 and 1947,
respectively, no longer works to the good of the American economy. While it
may have been well suited to the industrial society of the 1930s to 1950s, when
it helped deliver enormous growth in real income and productivity, the New
Deal system has not adjusted well to the economic realities of the 1990s.
The New Deal system was designed to allow worker selection of exclusive
union bargaining representatives
1 through secret ballot elections free of man-
agement interference, and to buttress collective bargaining between such repre-
sentatives and management as a way of dividing the economic pie between
Joel Rogers is professor of law, political science, and sociology at the University of Wisconsin-
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In thinking about the subject matter of this essay, the author benefits from ongoing collabora-
tions with Joshua Cohen, Daniel Luria, Wade Rathke, Charles Sabel, and especially Richard Free-
man and Wolfgang Streeck. See Cohen and Rogers (1992, 1993, 1995), Luria and Rogers (1993),
Rathke and Rogers (1994), Rogers and Sabel (1993), Freeman and Rogers (1993a, 1993b, 1993c,
1994, in progress), and Rogers and Streeck (1994a, 1994b). The following draws freely from this
joint work—in particular, from Freeman and Rogers (1993c) and Rogers and Streeck (1994a)—
while holding all coauthors blameless for errors that have survived their care.
1. The entire structure of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA; the Wagner and Taft-
Hartley Acts, as amended) is directed to specifying the rights, obligations, and conditions of emer-
gence and stability of such exclusive representatives. The importance of exclusivity in turn derived
from assumptions about the appropriate ambit of negotiated wage and benefit settlements. The
LMRA contemplates collective bargaining on a firm rather than industry basis. It also generally
does not contemplate use of "extension laws," common in Europe, extending the terms of collec-
tive agreements to firms not party to negotiation. Without extension, worker gains from collective
bargaining depend on worker strength within particular firms. Exclusivity is the gravamen of such
power, and thus the key to stability in collective bargaining. See the discussion below.
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labor and capital.
2 At the core of the Wagner Act was the conviction that union
representation within firms was not only a moral imperative but an economic
and political good. The basic economic idea was that workers, acting collec-
tively, would be able to drive up wages. In a closed economy with unemployed
resources, the resulting increase in demand would stimulate private investment
and job growth. The basic political idea was that, inside the firm and out,
worker organization would help American democracy by providing a "counter-
vailing power" to otherwise overwhelming business domination.
The core ideas of this system—that workers should enjoy associational
rights within and without the firm and that collective worker organizations can
contribute to the vitality of the American economy—retain currency today.
But the particular ways in which these ideas were institutionalized in the New
Deal system appear increasingly inapposite to present circumstance. The New
Deal system effectively premised: a sharp distinction between production
workers, who were assumed to be solely concerned with wages and working
conditions, and management, who were assumed to have full competence in
running the enterprise;
3 an essentially closed economy, with little international
wage competition; the organization of production along "Fordist" and "Tay-
lorist" lines, in which the dominant model of efficient production was a large
firm featuring assembly-line mass production of standardized goods by un-
skilled and semiskilled labor; and the feasibility of providing a family wage
and benefit package through lifetime jobs held by single male breadwinners.
Put simply, the world described by these premises no longer exists—workers
have other interests, management needs more worker involvement, the econ-
omy is more open, production is more flexible and quality driven, jobs are less
stable, the workforce is more diverse—and the system based on them works
poorly in the world that does.
The costs of this institutional mismatch are widely distributed.
4 Unions—
the only form of independent collective worker organization contemplated in
the system—are effectively denied their right to organize, and escalating em-
2. Such division, of course, is not the only function of collective bargaining, much of which is
concerned with nonmaterial benefits (e.g., rules on notice and fair treatment), with transfers among
workers (e.g., "solidarity" bargaining), and with the appropriate form material gains should take
(e.g., wages vs. benefits). Still, determining the worker share of the production surplus is the key
function of collective bargaining, and the one which conditions performance of most others.
3. Reflected in the "adversarialism" that has always defined U.S. industrial relations, acceptance
of this distinction was a cardinal principle on both sides of the labor-management relation. Con-
sider the heavily circumscribed vision of George Meany, as expressed shortly after he assumed the
presidency of the new AFL-CIO: "Those matters that do not touch a worker directly, a union
cannot and will not challenge. These may include investment policy, a decision to make a new
product, a desire to erect a new plant so as to be closer to expanding markets, etc. ... But where
management decisions affect a worker directly, a union will intervene" (quoted in Derber 1970,
92).
4. Of course, they are not distributed equally. As indicated in a moment in the text, unions are
e.g. threatened with extinction while employers are only constrained in their strategies of nonunion
worker "empowerment."377 United States: Lessons from Abroad and Home
ployer opposition
5 is rapidly "disappearing" them as a presence in national
public life.
6 Individual managements, while generally welcoming the decline
of unions, are limited in their ability to support advanced forms of worker
participation in the nonunionized sector.
7 Workers are denied voice, choice of
its form, and protection from economic insecurity. The nation as a whole suf-
fers from lost productivity growth, rising inequality, a failure to block the "low-
road" response to rising competition, ineffective enforcement of labor stan-
dards, and, less tangible but no less real, the erosion of democratic norms.
8
For all the reasons so many have to be unhappy with the present system,
5. Increased employer resistance is reflected in the sharp increase in employer unfair labor prac-
tice charges issued by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) since the early 1970s. The
reasons for increased resistance are many, but two bear special note. First, internationalization and
the union decline itself put wages and benefits once "taken out of competition" forcefully back in.
This provides clear economic incentives for firms to resist unionization. Second, increased product
market instability has put a premium on flexibility in workplaces and corporate structure. While
the experience of other countries (and selective cooperative programs in the United States) indi-
cates that such flexibility can be achieved under unionization, most managers strongly prefer uni-
laterally imposed to negotiated flexibility.
6. The United States now approximates the "union-free" environment favored by professional
antiunionists. Private sector union density now stands just above 11 percent and on a continuation
of current trends should fall to about 5 percent by the end of the decade. Of course, history has
not always been kind to predictions of continued union decline. In 1932, the president of the
American Economic Association spoke confidently of the "lessening importance of trade unionism
in American economic organization" as one of the "fundamental alterations" of American society
(Barnett 1933,1). Without some radical changes in the conditions and strategies of union organiz-
ing, however, it seems most unlikely that the coming years will see anything like the burst in union
power that made these remarks ridiculous.
7. Section 8(a)(2) of the LMRA makes it unlawful for an employer to "dominate or interfere
with the formation of administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other
support to it." Deliberately, "labor organization" is elsewhere defined broadly to include not only
labor unions but "any organization of any kind or any agency or employee representation commit-
tee or plan" that features (1) employee participation, (2) the representation of some employees by
others, in (3) dealings with the employer regarding (4) one or more of six traditional subjects of
collective bargaining: grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, and
conditions of work. For at least some nonunion employers, this imposes a restraint on desired
innovations in worker participation and "empowerment" in workplace governance. E.g., an em-
ployer that set out the purposes and powers of a committee making decisions concerning the terms
and conditions of employment (e.g., on health and safety or the use of a new technology), subsi-
dized that committee, or appointed some of its managers to it—even if it permitted workers free
choice in selecting their representatives to it—would likely be in violation of section 8(a)(2).
8. While few would blame our obsolete labor relations framework and the denial of collective
voice to workers for all the country's economic ills, there is growing consensus that they contribute
to a host of problems and at this point pose a real barrier to economic renewal. Union decline
accounts for about a fifth of the recent rise in American earnings inequality (Freeman 1989; Card
1991), itself an extreme outlier in comparative terms (Freeman and Katz 1994). It contributes to
declining company provision of private social welfare benefits, such as pensions and health care
(Rogers 1990; Bloom and Freeman 1992). And it encourages federal regulations and court suits
to resolve labor problems and protect workers, which are not as flexible or effective as labor-
management negotiation at specific workplaces (Flanagan 1987; Weiler 1990). The more general
lack of voice representation mechanisms in the present system depresses the productivity gains
that would come of substantive worker involvement in enterprise management and job design
(Blinder 1990; Mishel and Voos 1992) and contributes to a "hire and fire" culture that discourages
investments in human capital (Aoki 1988; Cole 1989; Kochan and Osterman 1991; Office of Tech-
nology Assessment [OTA] 1990). On the relation between democratic performance and the level378 Joel Rogers
however, the path of reform is far from clear. At present, there is no consensus
on the elements of reform nor even sense of how consensus might be orga-
nized. Organized business and organized labor remain sharply divided over
their vision of the role of worker organization in the new economy. However
unfairly, both are also generally regarded as self-serving in their proposals for
reform. At the same time, each retains the power to block the other's favored
agenda, and neither favors wholesale transformation of the present system of
the sort that many now think is needed.
9 Not surprising given this background,
the present administration—already limited in its ability to move favored legis-
lation by a Republican-dominated Congress—is deeply ambivalent on the
topic. While its appointment of a Commission on the Future of Worker/Man-
agement Relations (the "Dunlop Commission")
1
0 has at least formally put la-
bor law reform on the national agenda, few observers rank it such a high ad-
ministration priority. And among the general public, whose views on the
subject are barely known," labor law reform is simply not an issue of great
salience. In brief, labor law reform lacks a public constituency and an articulate
and credible agent—compounding uncertainty about what a workable frame-
work for reform might be.
It is in this context, for good or ill, that considerable interest has been ex-
pressed in importing some version of a council system to the United States.
1
2
Claiming potential gains to democracy, firm efficiency, and the effectiveness
of workplace regulation, proponents argue that councils would: (1) provide at
of independent collective worker organization, see Cohen and Rogers (1992, 1993), Freeman and
Rogers (1993c), Rogers and Sabel (1993), and Putnam (1992).
9. While perhaps sharing prudential concerns about the unintended consequences of global
change, the key parties oppose it for different reasons. Labor fears change because its position is
already so tenuous; business does not want change because it can already get much of what it
wants outside existing legal constraints.
10. So named because of its chair, former Secretary of Labor John Dunlop. The recommenda-
tions of the commission, which postdate this writing if not this volume, will almost surely be
limited—some speedup in election process, some greater curbs on employer unfair labor practices,
some extension of coverage of existing law, some limited exceptions to current section 8(a)(2)
prohibitions, some promotion of alternative dispute resolution systems in disputes about work-
place rights. These, even if followed, will not amount to wholesale reform of the system and seem
unlikely to set the agenda for whatever reform Congress does consider.
11. Determining such is the major goal of the effort outlined in Freeman and Rogers (1993b),
with a preliminary report below.
12. Among those making the argument are Adams (1983, 1985), Freeman and Rogers (1993c),
Kochan and Osterman (1991), Wever, Kochan, and Berg (1991), Weiler (1990), and, for some
time now, Summers (1979, 1982, 1994).
In the 103d Congress, 2d Session, Senator Pell introduced legislation on the subject (S. 2499).
The Pell proposal, described by his office as a "discussion starter," would permit the establishment
of labor-management committees to "discuss matters of interest and concern (including but not
limited to issues of quality, productivity, improved labor-management relations, job security, orga-
nizational efficiency and enhanced economic development" upon "the agreement of both the em-
ployer and a majority of employees." The committees would be composed of equal numbers of
employees (elected by fellow employees) and management officials chosen by the management.379 United States: Lessons from Abroad and Home
least some representation to those American workers who want increased voice
in firm decision making but who do not desire, or who desire but are not any-
time likely to enjoy, the benefits of traditional unionization; (2) improve enter-
prise and general market efficiency by improving the flow of information be-
tween management and labor on issues of mutual concern and, more
specifically, facilitate wider adoption of "high-performance" forms of worker
organization associated with greater worker involvement, training, productiv-
ity, and, more ambiguously, compensation; (3) improve the effectiveness of
government regulation of the workplace, chiefly by providing an additional set
of eyes and ears for government regulations—a local means of monitoring and
enforcement far exceeding the capacities of any plausibly sized inspectorate.
Apart from notice of political infeasibility or opposition to the norms im-
plicit in the above, arguments against councils take the form chiefly of doubts
about the magnitude—not general direction
13—of the above-claimed effects,
and concerns about the disruption of existing industrial relations institutions
by transplant of this "foreign" one. An allied but distinct objection goes less to
the merits of councils per se than to the relative weight they should receive in
the portfolio of reform energies. Commonly suggested alternative foci range
from a more general "experimental" approach to opening up representation
options within firms—itself associated with calls for the formal repeal of the
current ban on "company unions"—to facilitating union organization or, above
the enterprise level, to reform of current wage regulation.
In what follows I assess these competing claims and concerns in light of
comparative experience with works councils and the history of councils and
council-like forms in the United States. The assessment has three parts.
Against the backdrop of a growing "representation gap" in United States, sec-
tion 13.2 summarizes the principal values served by collective workplace or-
ganization and the contribution of councils to realizing those values. Section
13.3 considers the history of councilist and council-like forms in the United
States and the vitality of alternative nonunion forms of representation. Section
13.4 addresses the transplant issue. Section 13.5 briefly situates suggestions
for councilar reform in the broader context of the present system's problems.
13.2 Democracy, Efficiency, and Regulatory Performance
The most immediate motivation for considering works councils as a policy
initiative in the United States is straightforward. After a 40-year decline, pri-
vate sector union density has fallen to a pre-Wagner Act level of 12 percent
(Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS] 1994). At current rates of new organizing,
13. In all the literature considered in research on this volume, I have yet to find any argument
that councils actually weaken workplace democracy, reduce the efficiency of firms, or hamper
government regulatory efforts. Negative assessments invariably take the form of questioning the
robustness of these positive effects, often relative to alternative means.380 Joel Rogers
density will drop to 5 percent by the turn of the century.
1
4 Given the absence
of formal modes of collective voice in nonunionized firms and U.S. labor law
restrictions on company unions, only a few workers will have any form of
worker representation within private enterprises.
The United States is hardly the only advanced industrial economy in which
union membership fell in the 1980s; decline occurred in most OECD countries.
But the United States is a leader in deunionization, and it lacks any structure
of worker representation, inside or outside the firm, to compensate for declin-
ing union coverage. In Europe, falling union membership in the 1980s fol-
lowed a decade of increased unionization, with the result that rates of organiza-
tion were still relatively high at the outset of the 1990s, and comparable to
their level in the early 1970s. Moreover, mechanisms to extend collectively
bargained wages to nonunionized workers, while weaker than in the past, re-
main operative. And mandated works councils provide workers with collective
voice in nonunionized firms. In Japan, where union declines over the past 20
years have been pronounced, the shunto economywide wage adjustment sys-
tem remains robust. And company unions and other means of consensual deci-
sion making, including joint consultation committees, provide some mecha-
nism for worker voice within large enterprises (fig. 13.1).
Setting to the side for a moment the problem of external labor market regula-
tion, the absence of effective mechanisms of intrafirm employee voice occa-
sions several concerns. First, democratic ideals are compromised by the ab-
sence of collective representation for workers who want it. Survey data indicate
that some 30 to 40 million American workers without union representation
desire such and some 80 million workers, many of whom do not approve of
unions, desire some independent collective voice in their workplace.
1
5 These
numbers dwarf the 16 million or so members of organized labor and point to
a large "representation gap" in the American workplace. Second, there is good
evidence that this gap harms the economy. Many studies show the critical role
of effective labor relations in economic performance and the dependence of
14. At current rates of new organizing, this would describe a new equilibrium for private sector
density. There is, however, no reason to assume current organizing efforts will be sustained by a
substantially reduced membership. In 1992, the AFL-CIO estimated that it would lose an addi-
tional 500,000 members {Daily Labor Report 1992), or approximately 5 percent of its dues-paying
base. A continuation of that trend suggests a roughly 40 percent reduction in membership by the
end of the decade. The costs of recruiting new members through NLRB elections has also in-
creased: Chaison and Dhavale (1990) estimate that maintenance of current density levels will
require unions to make, over and above current organizing budgets, an expenditure of $300 million
annually. With rising new-member costs, a shrinking base, and essentially fixed costs for servicing
existing members, the 5 percent figure could be simply another point on the line of continuing
decline. On the other hand, innovative techniques of organizing, particularly outside NLRB elec-
tions, and the shrinkage of unionization to its most supportive core groups could produce a new
equilibrium above the 5 percent forecast. In either case, however, we see no signs of a "burst" of
unionization to an equilibrium above current rates of density.
15. This claim relies on various polls, including those reported in Gallup Organization (1988),
Fingerhut/Powers (1991), Quinn and Staines (1979), Louis Harris and Associates (1984), Davis




Fig. 13.1 Trends in unionization, 1970-90: Europe, Japan, and the
United States
Sources: OECD (1991,1992); BLS, union membership data gathered from various sources (1992);
The Economist Book of Vital Statistics 1990.
Notes: Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Union density figures for Europe were weighted
using the 1988 labor force size for each country. For 1990, union density rates for Europe and
Japan are 1988 figures.
effective labor relations on worker representation. Third, in many areas of pub-
lic regulatory concern about the workplace—occupational safety and health,
wages and hours, and workforce training among them—an effective system of
workplace representation appears vital to the achievement of social goals.
13.2.1 Workplace Democracy and Collective Representation
The ideal of democracy is stated simply enough: as moral equals, all persons
should be equally free to determine the terms and conditions of social associa-
tion. As applied to life outside the firm, commitment to the ideal implies lim-
iting inequalities in public life due to ethically irrelevant differences among
citizens and guaranteeing equal treatment under law, equal access to public
goods, and so on. As applied to the workplace, it implies equalizing power
between owners and producers, managers and supervised employees.
The case for workplace democracy can be made on both instrumental and
noninstrumental grounds.
1
6 The instrumental argument is that workplace de-
mocracy strengthens democracy in the broader society. Democracy requires
some equality in the distribution of material resources, and this is unlikely
16. This is a generalization. Elster's (1986) argument for workplace democracy on "self-
realization" grounds, e.g., falls into neither category. See Cohen (1989) for a useful inventory of
existing arguments.382 Joel Rogers
without some measure of worker representation inside firms (Cohen and Rog-
ers 1983). Also, democracy requires citizens capable and confident in their
exercise of deliberative political judgment, and these citizen attributes are un-
likely to arise in a society that shows no respect for such attributes at work
(Pateman 1970). The noninstrumental argument proceeds by extension of
democratic principles beyond formal politics. Democracy might be character-
ized as the idea that those involved in a socially cooperative activity and bound
by its rules have a right to determine those rules. This principle has applicabil-
ity beyond the state to other sorts of rule-governed cooperative activity, includ-
ing the cooperative activity of the firm (Dahl 1985, 1989). And this may be
particularly so when, as in the case of corporations, the democratic state itself
charters and protects the institutions governing such activity.
1
7
Thus understood, it is almost definitional that organizations that facilitate
effective worker definition and expression of interests inside the firm contrib-
ute to workplace democracy. Do councils do this? Certainly. They are arenas
of collective deliberation by workers about issues that concern them inside the
firm, a partial counterweight to unilateral management decision making, and a
check on rival forms of representation.
17. If these sorts of arguments for workplace democracy are familiar, the arguments for qualify-
ing commitments to workplace democracy are equally so. Two objections might be distinguished.
The first is that people can more easily avoid autocratic bosses than they can autocratic govern-
ments. In a market economy, they can quit their jobs and find a different employer or set up their
own business. But it is easy to exaggerate the power of exit. Quitting unsatisfactory conditions is
an attractive, even exhilarating prospect if you can rapidly find a job paying comparable compensa-
tion elsewhere. But in practice, substantial unemployment, large wage differences across firms and
sectors, and many firm-specific, nonportable social benefits, makes exit nonviable for many work-
ers, and potentially least useful to those most in need of protection from autocratic management:
the less skilled. Moreover, even where exit options from undemocratic conditions exist, they are
not recognized, in formal politics, as compelling arguments against remediation. That it is possible
to move from a town that denies its citizens the right to vote, e.g., is never seriously offered as a
reason not to reform that town's government. Employing the obverse of the extension argument
used above, there is no reason such an argument not respected outside the workplace should be
respected within it.
A second objection goes to the different functions of formal government and firms. Firms, the
argument goes, are designed to produce economic value, not to govern social life, and this implies
different criteria of performance. Governments are at least in part judged by representativeness.
What firms are judged by is the "market test" of profitability. This objection, which denies any
force to the extension argument, might be answered in two ways. First, the distinction between
firms and governments is overdrawn. Governments are routinely judged by their success in produc-
ing economic value. As a vast literature in comparative politics attests, economic performance is
the single best predictor of stability in government (Eulau and Lewis-Beck 1985; Lewis-Beck and
Lafay 1991). And firms are routinely judged by standards of conduct more encompassing than
profitability. While firms must meet the market test, along the way to doing so they must typically
meet other tests, including the recruitment and nondiscriminatory treatment of an adequate labor
force. Second and more directly, however, the argument has little practical force. If workplace
democracy extracted immense losses in production, we might decide that it was not worth the cost.
But while we could undoubtedly devise forms of workplace democracy that are economically
costly, the analysis just offered and the practical experience of successful capitalist economies
with high levels of worker representation suggest that the opposite is more likely to be true in the
real world: a well-designed system of workplace democracy can raise social production.383 United States: Lessons from Abroad and Home
That councils provide a form of democratic participation attractive to work-
ers themselves is evident from the level of worker participation in them. As the
country studies here show, that level is high. In the highly developed German
system, for example, councils are elected every four years on a nationwide
election day, with opposing slates of candidates in each workplace that has a
council, and turnout averaging around 90 percent. During the election cam-
paign unions contend with opposition from competing unions and from non-
union groups, which often try to win votes by distancing themselves from
unionism and emphasizing their closeness to the employer. For the largest Ger-
man union confederation, the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, it has been a
source of strength, legitimacy, and pride that the candidates of its affiliates
regularly win about 80 percent of works council seats nationwide (more in
most large firms). In countries with multiunionism, works council elections
force unions to match their policies to the preferences of large numbers of
workers, unionized or not, and to measure regularly and publicly their support
against that of their competitors. In these ways, a council system promotes a
certain accountability of unions to those they purport to serve.
13.2.2 Contributions to Efficiency
Modern economic analysis shows that a well-designed system of intrafirm
worker representation can produce economic benefit not just workers, but to
firms themselves.
Recognition that information exists at various levels of organizations im-
plies that in many situations it is inefficient for management to make key deci-
sions. Hierarchies tend to work best when there is very low or very high uncer-
tainty at workplaces (so that workplace-specific information provides little
guidance on optimal decisions), but at intermediate levels of uncertainty, giv-
ing workers the authority to make some workplace decisions is efficient, as
they can react better (more quickly, with a response informed by appropriate
local knowledge) than centralized management to workplace-specific shocks
or unusual circumstances (Aoki 1990, 1988).
The potential for divergent interest groups within firm hierarchies to use
information for their own benefit at the expense of the firm implies that there
may be payoffs from devising information and incentive structures that link
top management to workers outside the standard hierarchy. Diverse principal-
agent models make this point in various ways; Tirole (1986) develops it in
the context of a three-level firm hierarchy: top management, supervisors, and
workers, where a major issue is the possibility for coalitions among the players.
Other work focuses on strategies to elicit effort, from incentive pay systems—
such as rank-order tournaments (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Lazear 1991), profit
sharing (Estrin, Grout, and Wadhwani 1987; Weitzman and Kruse 1990),
"gain-sharing" schemes such as the Scanlon, Rucker, and Improshare plans
(Eaton and Voos 1992; Kaufman 1992), and employee ownership through em-
ployee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and other mechanisms (Bloom 1986;384 Joel Rogers
Blasi 1988)—to worker participation in management (Levine and Tyson 1990;
Eaton and Voos 1992). The major finding is that innovations that give employ-
ees substantial decision-making authority ("strategic participation") and a
share of resultant productivity increases improve productivity. Weitzman and
Kruse report favorably on profit sharing. The General Accounting Office (GAO
1986, 1988) and Conte and Svejnar (1990) find that the productivity effects of
ESOPs are substantial and positive when the ESOP links worker stock owner-
ship to substantial participation in daily firm management but not when worker
participation is weak or ambiguous. The importance of such linkage finds gen-
eral support, over a wide range of incentive schemes, in the reviews of Levine
and Tyson (1990) and Eaton and Voos (1992).
1
8
Labor relations practices based on voice instead of exit also show benefits
in training practice. Human capital analyses of investment in firm-specific
skills point to the advantages of job rotation and consultation (Koike 1984,
1989; Cole 1979, 1989; Morishima 1991a, 1991b) and highlight the incentive
to make investments in training specific to enterprises when workers and firms
expect low turnover.
1
9 This contrasts with studies documenting the limited firm
training efforts directed to "frontline" production workers in the United States
(Commission on the Skills of the American Workforce 1990; OTA 1990;
Osterman 1990).
In chapter 2 of this volume, Freeman and Lazear model the ways in which
works councils can produce such happy effects. They stress the virtue of the
following: increasing information flows from management to labor, which can
lead to worker concessions in difficult economic times, saving troubled enter-
prises; increasing information flows from workers to management outside the
hierarchical chain; providing a forum for both sides to devise new solutions to
problems; and motivating workers to make longer-term commitments to the
firm. In this analysis, collective voice in the workplace has benefits to the enter-
prise beyond discouraging strikes due to unmet grievances (a major goal of the
Wagner Act) or saving the costs of turnover by reducing quits or giving workers
the compensation package they desire (stressed by Freeman and Medoff 1984).
It alters the way management and labor operate, creating a more cooperative
and informative decision process.
The way it does so, it bears emphasis, and of relevance to our focus on
collective representation, is by changing the power relations between workers
18. Firm experiments with Quality of Work Life and Total Quality Management programs,
discussed in section 13.4, suggest that managers recognize this link but still have problems devel-
oping successful participation schemes. Despite the widespread finding that worker participation
is key to the success of ESOPs, e.g., the GAO (1986) estimates that only one in four ESOPs
includes greater employee input into decision making.
19. In Germany, to take a prominent example, the effect of intrafirm representation is to force
management to train more broadly than would otherwise be the case. Since pervasive council
representation effectively diffuses this effect across firms, however, no firm is uniquely disadvan-
taged by training more workers or more broadly than it would otherwise choose. And the economy
as a whole benefits from the resulting effort.385 United States: Lessons from Abroad and Home
and management. On the side of workers, it is their greater control over the use
of information they provide to management that leads them to provide it in the
first place. Without such control, workers are reluctant to provide the informa-
tion useful to improving enterprise efficiency for fear that gains in efficiency
will come at the expense of their security or compensation. On the side of
management, the same increase in the ability of workers to constrain manage-
ment explains the most commonly observed efficiency effects on management.
First, knowing that workers will interrogate decisions that affect their jobs,
management must consider more fully the costs and benefits of actions its pro-
poses to take. This limits costly mistakes arising from simple lack of reflection.
Second, a management that must discuss its labor decisions with employee
representatives will invest more in knowing how workers currently fare, and
the likely consequences to them of a change in action, than a management
concerned solely with stockholders.
2
0
Works councils institutionalize such a power shift inside firms. With strong
works councils, employers cannot abolish worker participation unilaterally.
Since they know this, they will consider it a waste to try and will direct their
efforts to building constructive relations with workers, and the operation of the
council itself will not be shadowed (as union relations typically are in the
United States) by a prehistory of employer resistance. On the side of workers,
knowledge that the employer cannot abolish the council, and therefore will not
try, permits workers to be less defensive in their employer dealings than under
less safe conditions. The permanence of the council structure, finally, permits
both sides to extend their time horizons in mutual dealings through it. A coun-
cil can extend "credit" to the employer over long periods. And, not having to
insure against aggressive short-termism from worker representatives uncertain
of their long-term status, management can assume that works councils will
keep commitments even in difficult times.
Consultation and co-determination rights vested in representative bodies
create space for joint deliberation of decisions between management and
worker representatives. Typically, exercise of consultation and co-deter-
mination rights delays decisions while at the same time improving their qual-
ity; this is the tenor of research on the impact of co-determination on German
management. Works councils that provide managers with skillful interlocutors
able to interrogate proposals and projects in depth make management consider
20. Imagine two interlocutors, A and B, at point X. A wishes to move to point Y; B, with
blocking power, must be persuaded of the wisdom of doing so. In seeking to persuade B that a
move to Y is in B's interest, A has incentives to familiarize itself intimately with B's present cir-
cumstance, if only better to show B that (perhaps contrary to B's initial perception of things) this
move is in fact in B's interest, and to learn of the least costly means (to B) of making it. Along the
way, A will gain knowledge of how B works and of alternative ways of getting from X to Y. In
general, A will become more skilled in making X-to-Y changes in incremental steps and in more
routinely spotting opportunities for incremental improvement. In this way, the change in power
relations helps underwrite continuous improvement in the organization of production and work—
the alleged sine qua non of contemporary business success.386 Joel Rogers
intended decisions more carefully and mobilize extensive information for their
justification. Co-determination, which gives works councils temporary veto
powers over decisions, may protect managements from narrow, short-term re-
sponses to market signals, helping them avoid costly mistakes arising from
lack of reflection.
If councils can thus promote efficiency within firms, they also have positive
effects on the efficiency of labor markets and multifirm production systems.
The way the former happens is straightforward. Increased information flow to
employees permits them to adjust to changed circumstances before they di-
rectly affect welfare—think of the positive effects of advance notice on plant
closings. The latter is more complicated but essentially derives from flows of
information and pressures for upgrading mediated by councils themselves.
In successful works councils systems, councils serve liaison functions with
the environment outside the firm, often helping the firm perceive and import
good practice. In this way councils help diffuse innovations across firm bound-
aries. In dealing with technical change and its consequences for work organiza-
tion, for example, councils in several countries may call in experts in ergonom-
ics to advise them and the employer on state-of-the-art solutions. Expert advice
helps standardize conditions across firms and draws the attention of firms to
advanced solutions that they might have found on their own only with delay
and at high cost. In Germany, council members have the right to attend training
courses, often organized by unions or employers' associations, on company
time and at the employer's expense. Courses deal with questions of new tech-
nology, work organization, working-time regimes, health and safety regula-
tions, changes in labor law, and the like. Such courses spread information on
high-standard solutions to a large number of workplaces.
Councils can also pressure managers to consider productivity enhancement
as opposed to other competitive strategies. By influencing firm decisions, they
force managers to consider decisions in light of the interests of employees, to
explore alternatives before presenting them for approval, and to learn about
their interlocutors (the workers themselves) and the conditions under which
they work in arguing for one among these alternatives. This forces a manage-
ment style that looks closely for the "win win" with employee interest. More-
over, the sheer imposition of demands for the satisfaction of such interests, for
example for further training, submits managers to certain productivity-
enhancing constraints. Councils cannot bargain over wages, but they can effec-
tively pressure management in ways that can push management toward high-
wage strategies, just as would imposition of high wages. These pressures,
diffused throughout the economy, exert a cumulative force for restructuring
along the path of upgrading labor.
13.2.3 Contributions to Regulatory Performance
Every society regulates some market outcomes, either to remedy market
imperfections or externalities, or for reasons of income redistribution. In the
United States, government inspectorates usually enforce regulations, often387 United States: Lessons from Abroad and Home
joined by private attorneys pursuing statutory rights through civil actions. In
many areas of public concern, however, including the labor market, neither of
these means of regulatory enforcement is adequate. Sites of regulated activity
are too numerous (six million work sites) for any plausibly sized state inspecto-
rate to monitor, and activity within them is too heterogeneous for a distant
state agency to decide the best means of achieving desired outcomes. Private
litigation, on the other hand, is a very costly and brittle way to settle disputes
about standards of behavior, and its cost makes it least amply supplied to the
less skilled who typically are most in need of standard enforcement. The result
is often regulatory failure—inadequate performance standards, cumbersome
reporting requirements on matters of uncertain relevance to desired ends, in-
flexibility in adjusting standards to varied or changed circumstance, and weak
enforcement.
2
1 The prominence of regulatory agents and lawyers in the compli-
ance process is widely perceived as a barrier to the intraflrm understandings
and practices needed to get desired results.
The example of worker safety and health suffices to carry the general point.
U.S. workers rate safe working conditions at the top of their expectations of
company performance (National Safe Workplace Institute [NSWI] 1992, 10),
and the 1970 Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) commits the gov-
ernment to "assure safe and healthful working conditions for working men and
women" (Public Law 91-596). But OSHA enforcement, which relies chiefly
on 2,000 federal and state inspectors, falls short of these expectations. Since
OSHA's enactment, some 200,000 workers have been killed on the job (about
300 per day), 1.4 million have been permanently disabled, and another 2 mil-
lion have died from occupationally related diseases. As of the early 1990s,
about 9 million workers sustained workplace injuries each year, of which 2.5
million were "serious," 70,000 resulted in permanent disablement, and 10,000
to 11,000 were fatal. Along with pain and suffering, this carnage carries costs
in the form of survivor benefits, insurance for hospitalization and other treat-
ment, and days lost in production estimated to run to some $200 billion annu-
ally (NSWI 1992).
2
2 Moreover, while health and safety data are difficult to
compare cross-nationally—due to different measurement standards and varia-
tions in reporting—comparison of like cases shows poor relative U.S. perfor-
mance. Comparing the United States to Sweden and Japan, for example, which
use the same reporting measures on occupational fatalities, shows death rates
in the United States 3.5 times those in Japan and 5.8 times those in Sweden
(International Labour Organization [ILO] 1988).
2
3 Both countries also show
21. The resulting regulatory failure is evident in low and uneven compliance with a range of
statutory protections—from child labor laws to occupational safety and health rules (GAO 1990,
1991).
22. This estimate includes the costs of deaths, injuries, and occupationally related disease.
Deaths alone (calculated on a 7,000 per year basis) are estimated to cost about $40 billion (Moore
and Vicusi 1990), and workplace injuries more than $80 billion (Hensler et al. 1991).
23. This comparison reflects adjustment for underreporting, applicable both to the United States
and Japan, by the National Safety and Work Institute.388 Joel Rogers
greater improvements in performance over time. In the 1980s, for example, the
percentage reduction in Japan's rate of workplace fatalities was better than
twice that of the United States.
2
4
While many factors contribute to the poor U.S. occupational health and
safety record, experts view the U.S. regulatory mechanism as a key factor
(Bardach and Kagen 1982; Noble 1986). U.S. reliance on state inspectors to
enforce health and safety standards contrasts to Japanese and European (and,
increasingly, Canadian) reliance on mandated worker health and safety com-
mittees within plants to supplement direct state regulatory efforts. These com-
mittees operate with delegated legal powers; they monitor, and in some mea-
sure enforce, compliance with regulations, while enjoying more or less broad
discretion in bargaining with management (usually also represented on the
committee) in choosing the most appropriate local means to achieve regulatory
goals.
2
5 In principle, a system that lodges responsibility for monitoring compli-
ance with health and safety committees, who should be better informed about
problems than government inspectors, and that gives those committees some
authority to address problems should enlist the knowledge of regulated actors
in finding ways in particular settings of satisfying publicly determined stan-
dards. That it does so in a context of declared representation rights, moreover,
mitigates use of costly litigation. Deputizing workers as local coadministrators
of health and safety regulation, of course, carries costs of its own. Worker
deputies must be trained and given time off from work to carry out committee
responsibilities. Still, most observers believe that the committees provide a
more efficient regulatory regime for safety and health than inspectorate and
civil liability schemes; this extends to initial experimentation with the ap-
proach in the United States itself (Bryce and Manga 1985; Deutsch 1988; U.S.
Department of Labor [USDOL] 1988; GAO 1992; Meridian Research, Inc.
1994; Weil 1994).
In Europe, as several of the country studies in this volume show, councils
are active in many more areas than health and safety, however. Recurring to
the German case, works councils are charged by law to monitor the employer's
observance with pertinent labor regulations—including legislation on employ-
ment protection or equal employment opportunities. German works councils
are also bound by any industrial agreement that unions and employers' associa-
tions may negotiate at the sectoral or national level—which, given extension
agreements, take on at least the color of more general public regulation—and
have the duty to ensure that employers do not pay wages below the industrial
agreement. They supervise compliance with statutory or collectively bargained
24. This comparison uses the same ILO series, but without adjustment for underreporting. It
shows a 67 percent decline in the rate of workplace fatalities in Japan over 1981-89, as compared
to a 29 percent decline in the United States (ILO 1988).
25. For overviews of Europe, see Bagnara, Misiti, and Wintersberger (1985) and Gustavsen and
Hunnius (1981); for a review of Japan, see Wokutch (1992); for a report on Ontario, the most
developed of the Canadian cases, see Ontario Advisory Council (1986).389 United States: Lessons from Abroad and Home
working-time regulations and are typically charged with negotiating the details
of their local implementation. Finally, they have the rights and obligation to
monitor employer compliance with Germany's public-private system of ap-
prenticeship vocational training. They monitor implementation of the nation-
ally standardized curricula for apprentice training at the workplace and are
obligated to ensure that apprentices are not unduly used for production and
that the skills they are taught are portable and not primarily workplace specific.
In all these areas, the availability of competent enforcement agents, with
interests and powers to make regulation "work" in ways respectful of local
variation, facilitates the achievement of public goals by facilitating cooperation
both between labor and capital and between the private sector and the state.
Employers would not have been willing to accept the 1980s German industrial
agreements on working-time reduction, for example, had they not known that
the enforcement of those agreements through councils would admit flexible
adjustment to local preferences and circumstances; unions would not have
been content with such enforcement had they not known that "flexibility"
would not amount to subversion. And neither unions nor employers would sup-
port Germany's fabled apprenticeship-based vocational training system as
strongly as they do without the same confidence in council flexibility and pow-
ers. Nor could the state plausibly contemplate governing such a system—two-
thirds of each age cohort undergoing three and a half years of apprenticeship
in one of about four hundred certified occupations—without the contribution
of local enforcement agents enjoying the confidence of private parties. And
German industrial policy would not be nearly as extensive and sophisticated
as it is if the state could not look, as it regularly does, to councils to provide
information on emerging needs, worker perspectives, and the effectiveness of
past use of government monies and other supports—information of a sort not
necessarily provided by employers.
13.3 U.S. Experience with Councils, Shop Committees, and Company
Unions
The United States has never mandated nonunion collective worker represen-
tation, but American firms have "experimented" at various times with institu-
tions that give elected nonunion employee committees a role in firm gover-
nance. Called "employee representation plans," "shop committees," or
"company unions" (depending largely on the sympathy of the observer)—or,
sometimes, "works councils"
26—these organizations grew in periods when
employers worried about finding tractable forms of employee voice to forestall
26. In his superb review of the choice against councils that the Wagner Act represented, David
Brody (1994) offers this advice on naming firm-specific joint committees: "The damning term
commonly used by historians, and by critics at the time, was the company union, but we will do
better to accept the term advanced by employers and one more functionally descriptive—the em-
ployee representation plan (ERP), or, in some companies, the works council."390 Joel Rogers
unionization or to reduce labor market strife that threatened wartime produc-
tion or, most recently, when employers sought to involve workers in responding
to international competition. The U.S. experience is valuable because it shows
how representation institutions function in a decentralized labor market absent
legal or other external mandating.
13.3.1 Early U.S. Experience
U.S. shop committees date back to 1833, and the giant cigarmaker
Straiton & Storm developed an elaborate employee representation scheme, in-
cluding independent arbitration for the resolution of employee-manager dis-
putes, in the late 1870s (Montgomery 1987, 350; Hogler and Grenier 1992).
The first great wave of employer representation plans in the United States,
however, came during World War I. Introduced to curb wartime strikes (they
typically involved explicit renunciation of the strike weapon), and with an eye
to inoculating the public against communist agitation, "works councils" or
"shop committees" were promoted by various wartime authorities. From virtu-
ally zero in 1917, their number grew spectacularly. By 1919, the National In-
dustrial Conference Board (NICB 1919) reported 225 plans covering half a
million employees, and by 1922, 725 plans operated throughout the country.
Employers reported decreased threats of unionization and reduced grievances
as obvious benefits of the plans. With the exception of a small number of plans
that provided more or less extensive participation rights, including representa-
tion on plant committees, representation on boards of directors, and participa-
tion in profits and stock ownership or collective bargaining,
2
7 however, most
of these plans gave workers no real power in decision making.
2
8
After the war, some large firms continued their company unions and welfare
programs. Many of those who introduced shop committees under pressure
from the NLB, however, dropped them (NICB 1919). In the mid-1920s, popu-
larization of the "American plan" open-shop drive to prevent unionization led
many smaller firms to introduce representation plans. Over 1919-28, total
membership in employer-initiated representation schemes grew from 0.4 to
As late as 1934, in announcing a labor settlement for the auto industry that explicitly recognized
such forms as legitimate, Franklin Delano Roosevelt expressed hope that it would provide the
basis on which "a more comprehensive, a more adequate and a more equitable system of industrial
relations may be built than ever before. It is my hope that the this system may develop into a kind
of works council in industry in which all groups of employees, whatever may be their choice of
organization or form of representation, may participate in joint conferences with their employer"
("Comparison of S. 2926 and S. 1958," Legislative History of the National Labor Relations Act,
1935, 2 vols. [Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959; reprint 1985], 1, 1347). See
as well Douglas (1921).
27. Brandes (1976, 131-32) notes that company unions had some success in wage and hour
negotiations at both Kimberly Clarke and the Colorado Fueland Iron Company, and developed
wage scales at Standard Oil of New Jersey.
28. These included Filene's, Dutchess Bleacheries, Boston Consolidated Gas, Louisville Rail-
roads, Columbia Conserve Company, Philadelphia Rapid Transit, Dennison, and Nash (see Derber
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1.5 million. Along with declining union membership during the 1920s, this
dramatically shifted the relative strength of the two representation forms. In
1919, plan membership equaled only 10 percent of union membership; by
1928, the ratio was 45 percent (Millis and Montgomery 1945, 837).
With the coming of the Depression, representation plans ebbed again: mem-
bership fell to 1.3 million over 1928-32. But the National Industrial Recovery
Act (NIRA) of 1933, which brought about a marked growth in trade union
activity and organization, also led to a resurgence in company unions. The
NIRA forbade employers from forcing employees to join company unions, but
not from encouraging the formation of such bodies (an encouragement that
was often tantamount to force). With increased threats of union organizing, the
company union movement again grew sharply. NICB and BLS data indicate
that, by 1935, over 3,100 companies, with 2.6 million employees, had some
significant percentage of their employees covered by representation plans, of
which two-thirds had been established since 1933 (Wilcock 1957). The ratio
of representation plan membership to trade union membership surged to 60
percent (Millis and Montgomery 1945, 841). In some sectors coverage was
even more widespread: for example, after passage of the National Recovery
Act, most basic steel companies established employee representation plans,
which spread to cover from 90 to 95 percent of the industry workforce (Bern-
stein 1970). This, however, was the highpoint for representation plans. In the
late 1930s the massive organizing drives of the CIO, aided by the prohibition
on employer "encouragement" of worker representation in section 8(2) of the
NLRA, effectively killed most of them.
During World War II, the government again promoted cooperative work-
place relations, this time the form of joint labor-management committees,
chiefly in union shops. These flared during the war, growing to cover some
seven million workers, but faded immediately thereafter (de Schweinitz 1949).
In the early postwar period, again chiefly in the organized portion of the work-
force, scattered efforts were made to formalize labor-management coopera-
tion. The best known of these were the Scanlon, Rucker, and other schemes
aimed at increasing employee productivity through profit sharing and bonuses.
Outside a few specific sites, however, these efforts never caught on in the un-
ionized sector; economy wide, their appeal was also limited (Derber 1970,
478-82).
2
9 One survey found that no company with more than 1,000 employees
and no establishment with more than 5,000 employees enjoyed an actively co-
operative relationship with its union. With very rare exceptions, the "coopera-
tive" strategy was limited to medium-sized, closely held firms, or to marginal
29. Harris (1982, 138-39) also describes efforts at "progressive" firms, notably U.S. Rubber
and General Electric, that were allied with the Committee for Economic Development and the
National Planning Association, two industry associations that encouraged labor-management co-
operation, to raise productivity through labor-management cooperation.392 Joel Rogers




As the prime historic case of employer-initiated works councils operating in
a largely nonunionized decentralized labor market, the U.S. experience in the
1920s to 1950s provides valuable insight into the potential for councils in such
a setting. It shows, first, that employer-initiated councils were neither a long-
lived stable institution nor one that was extended to the majority of the work-
force. Even at its peak the council movement covered only a minority of work-
ers, largely in big firms, and the peak came under threat of outside unioniza-
tion. Still, this minority was at times higher than the modest private sector
unionization rates of the early 1990s. Second, the NICB reports (1919, 1922)
and historical investigation (Jacoby 1989; Jacoby and Verma 1992; Nelson
1993) of the operation of councils show considerable diversity. In many cases,
company unions were the sham they have come to be widely viewed as, but in
some cases they offered significant and meaningful means of worker represen-
tation. Taking the NICB studies as valid, absent a guarantee of hard worker
rights to such things, or unionism or its immediate threat, "successful" worker
representation depended on management commitment—as evidenced in regu-
lar meetings, education, and, ideally, concrete payoffs to workers through, for
example, a profit-sharing (collective dividend) system (NICB 1922). Not
contemplating an actual extension of hard worker rights within the firm,
the NICB concluded that "where management is not thoroughly sold to the
idea ... a Works Council should not be formed" (NICB 1922, 10).
13.3.2 Recent U.S. Experience
Renewed interest in employee participation began building in the early
1970s. Focused on Quality of Work Life (QWL) programs, it was initially mo-
tivated by concerns about worker alienation (the "blue-collar blues"), which
many viewed as responsible for increased militance by assembly-line workers.
The National Commission of Productivity and Quality of Working Life and
the Ford Foundation sponsored a number of QWL experiments in the early
1970s in both union and nonunion plants. The most widely known included
the Rushton Mining Company and the General Motors (GM) Tarrytown plant,
which prior to the QWL program had one of the poorest labor relations and
production records of all GM plants but within a few years of QWL adoption
became one of the company's best-performing assembly plants. But implemen-
tation of QWL programs was never widespread, and most of the most-visible
experiments faded by the late 1970s—when government funding stopped (Ko-
chan, Katz, and Mower 1984, 6-7).
In the 1980s, driven by competitive pressures and management recognition
of the need to enlist employee energies to meet them, QWL programs enjoyed
30. See Nelson (1989) for an analysis of the historic roots of divergent managerial strategies in
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a resurgence. As noted, some 80 percent of the top 1,000 firms in the United
States reported having an employee participation or employee involvement
program (EIP), and many smaller firms experimented with one or another form
of employee involvement. The more recent programs came under various
names
31—QWL committees, quality circles, autonomous work teams, gain
sharing and ESOPs—and varied considerably in structure, representativeness,
scope of issues, substantive decision-making power, and links to other changes
in work organization. Cutcher-Gershenfeld (1987) estimated that 10 to 15 per-
cent of all American organizations had worker participation programs in the
1980s, covering about 20 percent of the workforce. Cooke (1990) estimated
that 40 to 50 percent of the unionized sector is involved with quality circles,
QWL programs, or some other form of employee involvement; of these, be-
tween one-third and two-thirds are jointly administered; about one-third of the
unionized sector has committee-based participation, with health and safety be-
ing the most common focus. In a more recent survey of large firms, Osterman
(1994) has found wider incidence of teams (54 percent), job rotation (43 per-
cent), quality circles (41 percent), and Total Quality Management programs
(34 percent)—although no unique combination of these innovations shows up
in more than 5 percent of companies.
Studies of these experiments confirm the 1920s experience. While studies
generally indicate positive economic effects from employee involvement, espe-
cially at the team level (USDOL 1993; Pfeffer 1994; Jacoby 1994), the eco-
nomic effects of worker involvement are most likely to be positive when work-
ers are empowered in decision making and receive concrete payoffs to
cooperation (Blinder 1990). In unionized settings, where worker power exists
independent of management, the evidence shows the greatest gains from coop-
eration (Eaton and Voos 1992; Kelley and Harrison 1992). In nonunionized
settings, where workers have no reserved rights, the performance and stability
of the programs depends on management attitudes, which vary widely across
firms and over time, and which are subject to an important core ambivalence:
even where managers recognize "empowerment" as necessary to productivity
gains, they are reluctant to relinquish discretion and control. To guarantee ef-
fective empowerment, much more is needed than management will provide on
its own.
13.4 A Rejected Transplant? Works Councils and the United States in
Comparative Context
Even if the representation gap is real and threatening and works councils are
broadly effective and useful in Europe, it does not follow that they can be
easily transplanted to the United States. Again leaving aside questions of politi-
31. See Eaton and Voos (1992, 208-10) for a comprehensive glossary of terms used to describe
contemporary innovations in employee participation and work organization.394 Joel Rogers
cal feasibility, the central issue here is how to get good effect out of a presump-
tive council system without destroying what little representation currently
exists.
Generalizing, the continental European systems in which councils appear
most effective have a developed "first channel" of worker representation and
labor-management dealings, centered on regional or national wage-setting
practices and political bargaining over the social wage and labor market policy,
external to the firm. In this context, councils provide a useful "second channel"
of worker representation internal to the firm. Indeed, as we have seen, one of
their central functions is to interpret and elaborate, within firms, the terms and
conditions of external agreements about how the economy should be run and
how the benefits and burdens of economic cooperation should be distributed.
Performance of this function often complicates, but seldom directly threatens,
the viability of external standard setting and agreements on these more global
concerns. The more centralized bodies provide technical assistance, coordina-
tion, and economic and political support to intrafirm activities; the councils
provide flexibility in achieving general standards and a multiplier on the den-
sity of their diffusion and enforcement.
In the United States, however, the first channel barely exists. It generally
lacks institutions linking workers in the political system or in wage setting
beyond direct collective bargaining. There is of course no labor or labor-
dominated party, and American politicians rarely articulate or explicitly direct
issues to achieving the aims of workers qua workers. Since the New Deal,
unions have been allied with the Democratic party, occasionally dominating
local party machines. But labor was a junior partner in the New Deal coalition,
and by the late 1970s had become an unfavored one (Ferguson and Rogers
1986). In the 1980s it faced "an indifference bordering on contempt" from
party leaders (Trumka 1992, 57). More broadly, unions have had a largely
clientelistic relation to the Democrats, looking to the party for patronage, fa-
vors, and select program supports, not as a "second arm" to achieve its vision
of a good society.
This situation contrasts with Western Europe, where social democratic or
labor parties govern countries regularly; with Canada, where unions affiliate
with the New Democratic party; and even with Japan, where socialist parties
are represented in national and regional government, and where the Rengo
union federation has run candidates for political office. In the United States,
by contrast, labor's main route of influence in the political system is through
special interest lobbying rather than through direct electoral power (fig. 13.2).
The relative weakness of labor in government, itself substantially a function
of low union density and centralization, in turn substantially explains why the
United States provides less benefits to citizens in the form of universal "social
wages" than European countries (fig. 13.3 and table 13.1). On a rank ordering
of OECD states by social funding of pensions, health care, unemployment in-
surance, and the like, the United States is second to last (Esping-Andersen




























Fig. 13.2 Left government against union density
Sources: Left government index created by Wilensky (1981) and compiled by Wallerstein (1989);
union density from Visser (1991).
Notes: Left government index is a cumulative index from 1991 to 1980. Union density is the
percentage of total employed that are union members.
ings and employer-provided benefits more in the United States than in most
other countries. Moreover, taxes and cash transfers are less redistributive than
in other countries. Comparing the effect of tax and transfer programs on pov-
erty among a group of OECD countries, for example, shows an average 79
percent reduction in poverty abroad, and only a 33 percent reduction in the
United States (Mishel and Bernstein 1992).
In turn, the greater universalism of nonwage benefits overseas, which takes
these benefits "out of competition," has an important consequence both for the
incentives and ability of workers to organize unions and for management to
oppose such organization. In the United States the onus of providing vacation
benefits, parental leave, access to training, health insurance, and so on, falls on
collective bargaining or individual employer personnel policy. As a result,
union-nonunion differences in these components of compensation as well as
in wages are exceptionally great. Large union-nonunion differentials in turn
motivate employer opposition to unions: when a union is certain to bargain
for greater expenditures on fringe benefits, which will put the firm at a cost
disadvantage, management will fight hard against unionization. At the same
time, the dependence of important benefits on nonunion personnel policies
reduces worker willingness to oppose management.






























Fig. 13.3 Left government/unionization against social spending
Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD National Accounts
(Paris, 1991); OECD (1991); Wallerstein (1989).
Table 13.1 Statutory Regulations Governing Benefits and Rights to Workers in
European Countries and the United States, 1991
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Source: Freeman (1994), tabulated from Ehrenberg (1993, tables 2.3-2.5 and 5.1) and from OECD
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tralized system in the developed world. Most collective bargaining and firm
wage setting is done on a firm-by-firm, even plant-by-plant, basis. Moreover,
except for "prevailing-wage" statutes in government construction (and some
procurement), the United States has few mechanisms, particularly in the pri-
vate sector, for extending the results of union-employer bargaining to non-
unionized employees.
3
2 The government plays little role in wage determination
(itself a consequence of the political weakness of labor) and sets the minimum
wage at levels that do not affect general wage patterns. Lack of extension of
collective bargaining settlements means that coverage by collective contracts
is essentially synonymous with union membership; if only 12 percent of pri-
vate sector workers are unionized, only 13 percent are even covered by some
union agreement. This contrasts with Europe, where many governments extend
the terms of collective contracts to nonunionized workers in a sector or region,
and Japan, where the shunto offensive establishes economywide wage patterns.
U.S. decentralized wage setting, with rent sharing between prosperous firms
and their workers, and limited provision of social wages, puts the country at
the top of the developed world in wage inequality (fig. 13.4).
3
3
The absence of a labor party and of encompassing wage-setting mechanisms
has important implications for the character of representation within firms. In
the United States, unions bargain for fringe benefits that are guaranteed by the
state elsewhere and bargain for wages that are set outside the firm in other
countries. Because higher fringes and wages can put firms at a competitive
disadvantage compared to others, confrontation at the bargaining table lies at
the heart of labor relations. In Europe—and to some extent even Japan—by
contrast, where general welfare benefits and wages are determined outside the
firm, there is greater space for the expression of cooperative employee voice
and bargaining within the firm. In effect, both sides can "afford" to cooperate
because their positions are secured or restrained outside the firm. Workers
know that their basic social benefits will remain intact and that their wages will
keep pace with those of other workers whatever trade-offs they make within
the firm. Management knows that the works council will not place it at a com-
petitive disadvantage through within-firm bargaining. External guarantees—
be they social benefit guarantees, centrally determined wages, or rights-based
sanctions on job loss—in some measure render moot much intrafirm disagree-
32. Pattern bargaining—the copying of a limited set of key bargains such as for steel or auto
manufacturing in many other parts of unionized manufacturing—and spillovers of union wage and
benefit gains to nonunionized workers due to the threat of unionization produced some implicit
institutional coordination in U.S. wage setting. While even at its peak pattern bargaining domi-
nated only a few unionized sectors, some experts believed that patterns spread informally to white-
collar workers in unionized firms, and as nonunionized firms raised blue-collar pay to forestall
unionization to dominate the overall labor market (Bok and Dunlop 1970).
33. Freeman (1991) and Card (1991) find that declining unionization accounts for one-fifth of
the increased variance in male wages over 1973-87. Lemieux (1993) attributes 40 percent of the
greater inequality in wages in the United States than in Canada to the difference in the rate of
unionization.398 Joel Rogers
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Fig. 13.4 Pay of low-wage and high-wage workers relative to median: United
States, Japan, and Europe
Source: Freeman (1994), calculated from OECD (1993, table 5.2)
ment about the division of the surplus. By taking many intrafirm disputes over
the surplus "off the table," these guarantees underwrite internal cooperation
and flexibility toward the joint goal of increasing firm performance. Standard
principles of rational behavior imply that when the share of the pie is exoge-
nous, self-interested parties will cooperate to make a bigger pie, as this is the
only way they can benefit themselves. When the share of the pie is "up for
grabs," by contrast, there is danger of noncooperative, low-output solutions to
prisoner's dilemma problems, including strikes, withholding information that
might raise output, and the like.
The implication of this analysis is that all labor relations systems face a
fundamental trade-off between external flexibility on one side and internal co-
operation and the flexibility that depends on cooperative arrangements on the
other. More flexibility in the external market implies less cooperativeness in
the internal market. European labor relations systems resolve the tension by a
dual channel of labor representation. They provide external guarantees through
encompassing collective bargaining and state provision of certain benefits and
seek internal cooperative relations through within-firm worker councils.
If external constraints and guarantees thus facilitate internal cooperation and
joint dealing, real external organizational power makes that dealing meaning-
ful. As is evident from the country studies, the interaction of unions and coun-
cils, the terms of their mutual dependence, are complex and varying. As a gen-
eral matter, however, it is clear that councils inside the firm work best when
they enjoy some relation, however distanced, to a powerful union movement
outside it. The latter is a source of residual political support—including, vi-
tally, that needed to extract resources necessary to council functioning from399 United States: Lessons from Abroad and Home
employers or the state—and expertise in issues of council concern, from ergo-
nomics to new technologies, work organizations, or whatever.
Where, as in the United States, wage bargaining is decentralized, the social
wage is exiguous, and the bargaining parties are not linked systematically to a
powerful set of encompassing political organizations; on the other hand, the
second channel of local union representation effectively takes on the welfare
function and stands alone. Defined by reference to the particulars of individual
firms, its preservation is contingent on the preservation of union strength in
particular settings. Accordingly, much importance is assigned to the precise
terms under which collective bargaining rights would attach within individual
firms and to the conditions for maintaining the fruits of organizing success
within firms. The arcana of American law regarding the formal certification of
bargaining representatives, and the requirement that those representatives be
exclusive, were solutions to the problem of contested, decentralized unioniza-
tion and wage bargaining. Without a general presumption of unionization, or
its equivalent in wage and benefit guarantees, employer assumption of these
costs was justified only upon a showing of majority support. Without general-
izing support from the state, the welfare of individual workers depended un-
usually on their bargaining power vis-a-vis specific individual employers. In
relation to those employers, exclusivity in representation—a guarantee of a
single collective voice—was the gravamen of worker power. Lacking a social
mandate, moreover, worker representation in the nonunionized sector de-
pended by definition on the will of employers. Given the destabilizing effect
of employer-dominated company unions in the 1920s, however, the expression
of this will in the form of material support or assistance to representative non-
union labor organizations was itself barred.
3
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Translating councils to this setting thus poses a series of nested challenges—
particularly threatening to labor, but posing more general threats to the stability
and success of a council system. For councils to be effective, the country stud-
ies tell us, they are best located within and supported by a broader framework
of labor-management dealings external to the firm. Construction and adminis-
tration of such a framework, which does not now exist, would require a consid-
erable increase in the power of competence of regional and national worker
organizations. A precondition of such an increase in power, however, is a
strengthening of the labor movement. And given its existing structure and fo-
34. For the rationale for such a bar—employer interference with autonomous employee choices
about representation—we do no better than to consider the first case decided by the NLRB, Penn-
sylvania Greyhound Lines, 1 NLRB 1 (1935), enfd. denied in part 91 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1937),
revd. 303 U.S. 261 (1938); cited in Electromation Inc., 309 NLRB 163 (1992). As the Greyhound
manager in charge of the company union challenged there summarized management's goals: "[I]t
is to our interest to pick our employees to serve on the committee who will work for the interest
of the company and will not be radical. This plan of representation should work out very well
providing the proper men are selected, and considerable thought should be given to the men placed
on this responsible Committee."400 Joel Rogers
cus, it is far from clear that the introduction of an alternative representative
structure, potentially overlapping with many of the functions now performed
by local unions, would have a strengthening effect. It seems at least equally
plausible that it would lead to substitution away from unions—as is suggested
by the Dutch case, and that of France—and a further devolution of the impor-
tance of extrafirm structures of mediation and support of the very sort desired.
If the above analysis of the sources of labor weakness is correct in its emphasis
on the negative effects of decentralization and particularity in bargaining,
it raises an obvious question. How would the introduction of further de-
centralization strengthen labor? Or posed more generally, if councils need
external unions to function well, and the introduction of councils would
weaken unions as presently organized in the United States, how would the
introduction of councils into this already decentralized system do anybody
any good?
Identification of this tension does not amount to a convincing argument
against councils. It does suggest, however, the need for some care in their po-
tential design in the United States. Several requirements would need to be sati-
sfied. First, premising an interest in not destroying what workplace organi-
zation does exist, encouragement of councils as independent forms of
representation would seem to need to be limited to nonunionized settings.
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Second, and whatever the range of issues councils discuss, some bright line
would need to be established between them and the wage-bargaining system.
This might be done categorically, by restricting council discussion to topics
other than wages and benefits. But experience both abroad and at home indi-
cates the difficulty of enforcing such categorical distinctions in practice. A
more practical approach, then, would be to limit council powers to information
and consultation. Third, even within this information-consultation power do-
main, it appears vital to build in some resource guarantees for their function-
ing—time off from work, money to hire outside assistance, enforceable rights
to elicit information from employers.
Such provisions would work to ensure that councils were in fact a supple-
ment to, rather than detraction from, existing workplace representation. But
they would not address the issue of management domination of the commit-
tees. In addressing that issue, we distinguish at the outset between the current
legal meaning of "domination" and the more precise normative concern with
abrogations of employee freedom in selecting representative forms. The cur-
rent bar on "company unions," deliberately, does not respect this distinction; it
treats identically situations that give no offense to the principle of employee
free choice in the selection of representative forms and those that do. The rea-
sons for this are many, but all come down finally to doubts among the framers
35. And, presumably, settings where unions are not currently engaged in organizing drives.401 United States: Lessons from Abroad and Home
of the Wagner Act about the stability and usefulness of drawing this distinction
too finely. On the one hand, the state's capacity to monitor offensive sorts of
domination inside firms was thought to be limited; better to go with institutions
whose very powers would provide the needed demonstration of independence.
On the other hand, the sorts of powers sought, during a period of deep depres-
sion in an essentially closed economy, went directly to wage-setting powers.
As Senator Wagner (1934) wrote in the New York Times at the time, while
nonbargaining or non-independent-bargaining institutions had "improved per-
sonal relations, group welfare activities, discipline, and other matters which
may be handled on a local basis ... [they have] failed dismally to standardize
or improve wage levels, for the wage question is a general one whose sweep
embraces whole industries, or States, or even the nation."
How, in a context in which even unions are incapable of setting wage lev-
els—removing, as Jacoby (1994) notes, at least one reason for not reopening
discussion—might the relevant distinction be made? Straightforwardly, it
would appear, by carving an "employee free choice" exception to section
8(a)(2). Hyde (1994) and Summers (1994) suggest how this might done. Leav-
ing that section intact and permitting a very expansive definition of "labor or-
ganization," "an employer who would otherwise violate that section by estab-
lishing or supporting a system of employee representation or communication
may defend against unfair labor practice charges by showing: (a) that the sys-
tem was authorized by a majority of employees in a secret ballot; (b) that be-
fore the ballot, employees were specifically advised of their right to oppose the
creation of such a plan without reprisal; (c) that such authorization expires in
some uniform period of time, perhaps three years, unless reauthorized" (Hyde
1994). To these provisions we might add: (d) that the system may be abolished
by a majority of employees in a secret ballot at any time; and (e) that the system
cannot at any time be unilaterally abolished by the employer. Were such condi-
tions satisfied, employer "domination" in the sense of "infringing worker inde-
pendence in choice of representative form" would be effectively extinguished.
Of course, the number of employers that would, under such clarification, actu-
ally seek nonunion independent worker representation is an open question.
How many workers, assuming enactment of the other reforms suggested here,
would choose this over rival representative forms is open as well. The real
values at stake, however, would be clarified in a way that they are not in the
present debate.
Comparative and domestic experience, along with a little creative drafting,
suggests how the transplant problem could be overcome. As I read the evi-
dence, it would in theory be possible to graft a "council option" onto the ex-
isting U.S. system, despite its obvious differences from European ones, with-
out serious damage to what currently exists. The essential requisite attributes
of the system would be powers limited to consultation and information, limita-
tion in independent incidence to the nonunionized sector, direct supports for402 Joel Rogers
functioning, and guarantees of employee freedom in opting into the structures
in the first place, choosing representatives, and termination.
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Finally, we may ask about the form that "encouragement" of council forma-
tion might take. It is striking, and instructive, that all functioning council sys-
tems involve some degree of state mandate of these forms—either direct or
the form of de minimus expressions of employee interest triggering their for-
mation. Prospects for such in the United States are at the moment vanishingly
remote, and the above considerations on design are framed by that fact. But
for all sorts of obvious reasons—uncertainty, adverse selection, snowballing
effects upon reaching critical mass—a commitment to diffusing councils
would appear to require their being mandated strongly (by, e.g., the condition-
ing of such government benefits as contracts or ESOP tax expenditures on their
establishment). The basic point is that there is no good reason to expect that
council structures will widely emerge on their own, and good reason to believe
that they would not, even if the general presence of councils were preferable
to the present state.
13.5 Related Aspects of Reform
Thus far, I have attempted to assess the potential contribution and require-
ments of council reform considered as a stand-alone reform. This exercise,
however, has been doubly artificial: in abstracting from the political realities
that make this a very low probability event and in considering councils merely
as an add-on to an otherwise unchanged system. Keeping the first abstraction
we might ask in closing, what are the sorts of other reforms that would enjoy
an "elective affinity" with some council initiative?
Three broad categories of reform seem most relevant:
First, as a widening of employee choice beyond the "all or nothing" choice
of majority unions or nothing, while guaranteeing freedom in that choice,
council reform might naturally be accompanied and supported by other mea-
sures aimed at the same goal.
Recognizing various imperfections in the "market" of associational choice
bearing on representation of worker interests, efforts might be made to perfect
that market. This means widening the range of employees permitted collective
representation, reducing the direct cost of their choosing such, and widening
the range of choice itself.
Widening the range of protected employees would mean abolishing most if
not all restrictions on the free choice of farm workers, individual contractors,
and supervisors, as well as those public employees in that half of the United
States that have still not recognized even minimal rights to self-organization.
Reducing the direct costs to employees in choosing representation would mean
36. Such guarantees find broad support in the Worker Representation and Participation Survey
(Freeman and Rogers 1994).403 United States: Lessons from Abroad and Home
institutionalizing respect for individual freedom in choice and collective
worker deliberation about how it might best be made. At present, as regards
the only available form of collective representation—unions—this condition
is clearly not satisfied. Whatever one's opinion of unions, current levels and
kinds of employer resistance to them clearly impose direct costs on employees
and corrupt the process of deliberation.
3
7 Getting closer to free deliberation
would thus appear to require more effective sanctions on such employer behav-
ior, quickly applied,
3
8 and some expedition of the election process itself.
Expansion of the range of representative forms naturally might not be limited
to the council option but might be extended to include minority unions, em-
ployee caucuses, and other associations below the majority level.
3
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Second, on no account do councils significantly contribute to wage equality.
And on all accounts their effective operation requires some external norming
of wages and benefits. So, the introduction of councils might naturally be allied
with efforts to raise the social wage in the United States, and to move bar-
gaining over wages and benefits beyond the individual firm.
40 Raising social
minima is in principle simple enough. Whether administered through firms or
not, certain basic benefits would be guaranteed on a societywide basis, much
as is currently being promised for health care. The efficiency benefits of doing
this are many. As against other means, minima are an efficient way to redistrib-
ute income, especially when receipt is conditioned on employment.
4
1 By rais-
ing the base price of labor, minima can also be an important spur to more
productive labor use, setting dynamic efficiencies in motion. And, by general-
izing certain standards of behavior and performance, minima facilitate flexi-
bility in the deployment of productive resources. As emphasized in recent dis-
cussions of health care benefits, socializing benefits promotes greater
37. Apart from repeated documentation of employer violations of the spirit and letter of the
LMRA, and the close correlation between such resistance and union failure in representation elec-
tions, perhaps the best evidence for the importance of management resistance to current employee
choices is provided by the public sector. Controlling for age, income, race, sex, occupation, and
all other conceivable individual and group variables, unionization in the public sector—essentially
free of management resistance—runs better than three times as high as in the private sector.
38. Sanctions might include such things as outright fines and treble compensatory damages for
actual violations of the law, or disqualification from government contract eligibility for repeat
offenders. Speed might be achieved by a requirement of hearings and determination of the merit
of employer unfair labor practices within 30 days of filing.
39. On their face, sections 9(a) and 8(a)(5) provide no suggestion that employers are not obli-
gated to bargain with such "minority unions." Contrary NLRB and court interpretations have stood
so long, however, that statutory amendment would now probably be required to establish this
obligation. Apart from administrative difficulties in handling the claims of such multiple unions
(themselves navigable through threshold representation requirements and rules on their interac-
tion), there seems no reason why it should not be—again, in the absence of an elected majority
representative. See Summers (1990).
40. Is this an appropriate topic of labor law reform? It is if that reform is seen as it should be—
as an effort aimed at addressing issues not only of worker representation or management preroga-
tive inside the firm but of the appropriate design of a societywide system of production and reward.
41. For a recent argument to this effect, and a more general review of the evidence on minima,
see Freeman (1993).404 Joel Rogers
allocative efficiency in the labor market. A firm A employee economically
(given skills, taste, whatever) best suited to firm B is more likely to find her
way to firm B if firm B does not suffer from a crippling shortfall in benefits
compared to those provided by firm A. The most obvious benefit, however, is
to the level of equality itself. By removing a chunk of individual welfare from
wage competition, minima make it more likely that those less fortunate in that
competition will still live a decent life.
While the United States seems unlikely ever to contemplate true peak bar-
gaining between unified union federations and a unified business community,
nor even anytime soon to contemplate the full use of extension laws in the
unorganized sector,
4
2 more modest efforts to facilitate wage generalization on
a regional or sectoral basis might be considered. The law on multiemployer
bargaining might be amended, shifting the presumption away from the volun-
tariness (and, inevitably, instability) of such arrangements and toward their re-
quirement.
4
3 And more ambitious schemes of "sectoral bargaining," of the sort
now being discussed in Canada, might be usefully considered.
4
4 In a given
area or industry grouping or both, sectors of employees, defined by common
occupational positions across different employers, could be defined (e.g., "res-
taurant workers in New York City"). Unions demonstrating support among
members of the sector at different sites would be permitted to bargain jointly
with all the employers corresponding to those sites. In subsequent organizing
during the term of the resulting contract, union certification at additional sites
would automatically accrete their employers to the population covered by the
contract, with that employer joining in the multiemployer bargaining in the
next round.
4
5 To make the scheme more palatable to employers and the general
public, its application might be limited to traditionally low-wage, underrepre-
sented sectors, characterized by highly uniform conditions of work.
Each of these areas of reform, of course, certainly no less than councilar
reform, are subjects of intense conflict. The point here is simply that in think-
ing about councils, policymakers would do well to consider the natural exter-
nal supports to their functioning.
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